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Abstract 2 
One of the most notable recent changes in autism science s the belief that autism is a 3 
heterogeneous condition with no singular essence. I argue that this notion of ‘autistic 4 
heterogeneity’ can be conceived as an ‘agential cut’ and traced to uncertainty work conducted 5 
by cognitive psychologists during the early 1990s. Researchers at this time overcame 6 
uncertainty in scientific theory by locating it within autism itself: epistemological uncertainty 7 
was interwoven with ontological indeterminacy and autism became heterogeneous and 8 
chance like, a condition determined by indeterminacy. This paper considers not only the 9 
conceptual significance of this move but also the impact upon forms of subjectivity. This 10 
analysis is undertaken by integrating the agential realism of Karen Barad with the historical 11 
ontology of Michel Foucault. I argue that these two approaches ar , firstly, concerned with 12 
ontologies of emergence and, secondly, foreground the inherently ethical nature of change. 13 
As such these theories can be used to articulate an ‘ethics of transformation’. I argue that the 14 
agential cut which brought about autistic heterogeneity is potentially problematic within an 15 
ethics of transformation, limiting the possibility of future change in subjectivity by imagining 16 
difference and resistance as properties of autism rather than the individual. 17 
Key words 18 
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Introduction 21 
Autism is widely understood as a neurodevelopmental condition (American Psychiatric 22 
Association 2013: 166) affecting around 1:100 individuals (Charman et al. 2011: 10) and for 23 
which neither cause nor cure is known (Bertoglio & Hendre 2009: 1). While there have been 24 
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significant changes to the core symptomology of autism over th  past seventy years (Evans 25 
2013), since the late 1970s there has been a consistent belief that autism is marked by social 26 
and communication impairments as well as restricted interests and repetitive behaviours 27 
(Feinstein 2010: 175).  28 
One notable change in scientific understandings of autism, which has occurred since the 29 
1980s, is the contemporary belief that autism is a particularly heterogeneous condition. It is 30 
now common for scientists to label autism a disorder of the ‘idiosyncratic brain’ (Hahamy et 31 
al. 2015), to refer to the ‘autisms’ (e.g. Geschwind & Levitt 2007), or suggest that we should 32 
‘give up on a single explanation for autism’ (e.g. Happé et al. 2006. See also Singh (2016)). 33 
These assertions all attest to the fact that autism is described to be, by its very nature, 34 
aleatoric1. While it is not, of course, unusual to suggest that psychiatri  classifications may be 35 
heterogeneous, the naturalisation and integration of heterog neity into the ontology of autism, 36 
the assertion that the condition has no singular essence or defining feature, is certainly 37 
striking.  38 
In this article I attempt to understand these narratives of heterogeneity, particularly their 39 
ethical and ontological consequences, with reference to a small body of research in cognitive 40 
psychology conducted in the early 1990s. I argue that the concept of a heterogeneous autism 41 
arises from uncertainty work undertaken within this research wherein epistemological 42 
uncertainties in scientific theory and experiment are understood as part of the ontology of 43 
autism. Uncertainty in work, in other words, came to be seen as evidence of indeterminacy in 44 
nature.  45 
                                                                 
1The term ‘aleatoric’ is taken here from the work of Ian Hacking (e.g. Hacking 1975). To refer to an object as 
aleatoric is to suggest that it is, by nature of its ontology, chance like. Following both Hacking  (e.g. Hacking 
1995: 234) and Barad (2007: 115, 265) I use the word uncertainty to denote an epistemological claim of the sort 
“I am not sure what has really happened” whereas indeterminacy refers to a hard, ontological claim about the 
aleatoric state of the world. As will become apparent, in the current empirical example at least, the policing of 
this boundary is problematic. 
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Undoubtedly, a heterogeneous autism has flourished and diversified in the years since this 46 
initial research took place, filling an evolving ‘ecological niche’ (Hacking 2002b). Ever 47 
broadening behavioural diagnostic criteria (Verhoeff 2013: 443), the elusive nature of 48 
autism’s genetic underpinnings (Navon 2011: 214), and the increasing number of voices from 49 
within self-advocacy movements emphasising their individuality (Moore 2014: 151), are all 50 
entangled with the heterogeneous nature of autism. Nonetheless, I argue that it is within this 51 
particular body of psychology research that an ‘agential cut’ takes place. 52 
This paper seeks to understand this transformation of autism into a heterogeneous condition 53 
by drawing upon the ethico-onto-epistemological framework of Karen Barad; a framework 54 
which investigates not only transformations in the world but also centralises the inherently 55 
ethical nature of these changes. Like Barad, I explore these claims through a focus upon a 56 
small number of experiments which I argue are key to understanding the emergence of a 57 
heterogeneous autism. 58 
Before this sustained empirical focus on autism, therefore, I flesh out the key conceptual tools 59 
offered by Barad and note the utility of the concept of an ‘agential cut’. I then go on to 60 
explore their significance to the production of subjectivities within diagnostic contexts and, in 61 
doing so, draw affinities with the ethical project of Michel Foucault which, like Barad, 62 
considers the ethics of transformation. I then bring these frameworks together with a body of 63 
research in sociology and Science and Technology Studies which has explored the ways in 64 
which scientific researchers deal with uncertainty. These introductory discussions lay the 65 
foundations for the empirical body of the paper within which I argue that – in the particular 66 
diagnostic context at stake - scientific uncertainties have been diffracted through autism and 67 
played a decisive role in the emergence of a heterogeneous autism, a role that is not only of 68 
conceptual and practical significance but which also has important ethical consequences. 69 
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Ethico-onto-epistemologies of transformation 70 
Barad’s philosophy 71 
In Meeting the Universe Halfway, Karen Barad argues that objects of scientific investigation 72 
cannot be disentangled from the apparatuses used to investigate hem. Importantly, by 73 
‘apparatus’ Barad does not only have in mind the equipment listed in a methods section. 74 
Rather, the apparatus includes the like of “class, nationalism, gender, and the politics of 75 
nationalism” among any number of other relevant material and discursive factors (Barad 76 
2007: 165). Indeed, Barad’s apparatus incorporates such a range of factors that it is hard to 77 
determine any outside of the apparatus at all; nothing is a priori excluded from influencing 78 
the nature of the object under investigation (see, for instance, the apparatus shown in Barad 79 
2007, page 389).  80 
Barad explores this key claim regarding the inseparability of measuring apparatuses and 81 
objects of analysis with reference to the famed uncertainty principle of Werner Heisenberg. 82 
Following Niels Bohr, Barad argues that it is an error to understand the uncertainty principle 83 
as an epistemological problem. It is not that we are uncertain about the qualities of particular 84 
entities - that we are unable to simultaneously measur position and momentum - rather it is 85 
that the entities in question are ontologically indeterminate nd cannot meaningfully be said 86 
to have had those properties prior to interactions with the appar tus used to investigate them. 87 
Thus, Barad states:  88 
“… there aren’t little things wandering aimlessly in the void that possess the complete 89 
set of properties that Newtonian physics assumes (e.g., position and momentum); 90 
rather, there is something fundamental about the nature of measurement interactions 91 
that, given particular measuring apparatus, certain properties become determinate, 92 
while others are specifically excluded.” (Barad 2007: 19, italics in original) 93 
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There are several aspects to this claim which are relevant to the diagnosis of autism and 94 
which are worth elucidating further, not only in order to comprehend Barad’s philosophy, but 95 
to grasp the conceptual and ethical thrust of her work.  96 
Firstly, Barad is not arguing that there are not real, determinate things-in-the-world. Rather, it 97 
is suggesting that the world does not exist in stasis, that things are not timeless, and that they 98 
do not pre-exist their interactions2. Secondly, because the term interaction retains a sense of 99 
separate entities coming together (e.g. a measuring apparatus and an object of study), Barad 100 
coins the neologism ‘intra-action’ to reinforce the claim that there is nothing prior to 101 
interaction and that new entities are ‘exteriorities within’, their boundaries arising from the 102 
inside of existing phenomena. Finally, the point at which a determinate entity emerges 103 
following an intra-action, the point from which we are able to delineate “the object of 104 
investigation from the agencies of observation” (Barad 2007: 115) is known as an “agential 105 
cut”. The agential cut is a crucial moment for not only are certain realities brought into being 106 
but other possibilities are necessarily excluded. Barad’s example concerning the uncertainty 107 
principle makes this particularly obvious; at the moment when a particular intra-action brings 108 
into being a particle with a determinate property (e.g. momentu ) another perfectly feasible 109 
possibility (e.g. a particle with a determinate position) is forecl sed. 110 
These features of Barad’s work make it valuable to the study of autism. There is, for 111 
example, no need to choose between the reality of the condition and the conclusion that 112 
                                                                 
2 As will be discussed at greater length in subsequent s ctions, there are strong affinities here betwen the work 
of Barad and Michel Foucault. Foucault referred favourably to ‘historical nominalism’ or ‘historical ontology’ 
(Davidson 2001: 36; see also Lemke 2011: 41-42) and this term has been taken up by several of his 
interlocutors, most notably Ian Hacking (e.g. Hacking 2007: 295; Madsen et al. 2013: 48). As Hacking says, 
“there is hardly a grain of so-called relativism” (Hacking 2002: 23) in this approach and, as Paul Veyne notes 
“there is no more relativism as soon as one has stopped opposing truth to time” (Veyne et al. 1993: 3). While 
Foucault and Barad understand history differently, what their approaches have in common is the centralisation 
of movement and becoming in ontological investigation. Where Barad departs from, or at least extends upon, 




autism has been significantly shaped by social and historical factors including disciplinary 113 
norms and competition, educational strategies, deinstitutionalisation, and (self-)advocacy 114 
groups (Chamak 2008; Evans 2013; Hollin 2014; Navon & Eyal 2014; Silverman 2012; 115 
Verhoeff 2012). Instead of a concern with whether autism should be understood with 116 
reference to factors which are either ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of science, attention is drawn 117 
towards a consideration of how autism has been delineated as an object of investigation, cut 118 
and re-cut from a particular apparatus which may readily incude all of the aforementioned 119 
material and discursive factors. In the following section I will show how, firstly, these 120 
becomings and transformations in autism are fundamentally ethical in nature and, secondly, 121 
how an ethics of transformation can be formed by uniting Barad’s work with that of Michel 122 
Foucault. 123 
Ethics at the hinge of history 124 
Barad’s work is reminiscent of that by John Law and Annemarie Mol who, firstly, reject 125 
‘perspectivalist’ views which assert that ontology is entirely separate from epistemology 126 
(Law 2004: 25) and, secondly, have conducted pioneering studies in the fields of medicine 127 
and diagnosis (Mol 2002). Where Barad’s work complements these approaches is in, not only 128 
the consistent focus upon ethics, but also the form which ethical consideration might take. 129 
Barad insists that “we are responsible for the cuts we help enact” (Barad 2007: 180). Further, 130 
because the creation of new entities “always entails constitutive exclusions” (Barad 2007: 131 
135), there is a highlighting of the fact that there arquestions of accountability regarding 132 
what gets included and what is othered from the world. Agential cuts are inevitable (Hoffman 133 
et al. 2015: 676), but the types of object produced are not and, therefore, there is 134 
responsibility attached to the way that worlds have been, and will be, made. 135 
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This ethical centring is consistent with, and complimentary to, the ethical project of Michel 136 
Foucault, even if a consideration of his ethics is entirely absent from Meeting the Universe 137 
Halfway. Like Barad, Foucault’s is an ethics of transformation. As Colin Koopman has 138 
recently argued, Foucault’s genealogical endeavours operate on “the hinge between a history 139 
of the formation of the subject and the possibility of the future transformation of the subject” 140 
(Koopman 2013: 526)3. A similar argument is made by Lemke (2011: 32) who contests ha  141 
Foucault’s historical endeavours are not deconstructions for the sake of deconstructions but, 142 
rather, were intended to encourage what Foucault referred to elsewhere as ‘limit-experiences’ 143 
(e.g. Foucault 1994: 241-242), occasions which suggest new ways of being, potential 144 
transformation in the very matter of the universe (Miller 1993: 29).  145 
On one plane of Foucault’s work, therefore, we have the backward looking ‘history of the 146 
formation of the subject’ and, on the other side of the hinge, the ‘limit-experience’, the 147 
forward looking possibility of future transformation. It is in these territories where Foucault’s 148 
project usefully intersects with Barad’s. Koopman suggests that while Foucault engaged in 149 
extensive histories in order to provoke limit-experiences that would make possible 150 
transformations in subjectivity, it would be a mistake to view such transformations as an 151 
ethical commitment; “Foucault is not telling us that we ought to transform ourselves” 152 
(Koopman 2013: 530) and while “Genealogies can provoke in us the sense that we should 153 
change ourselves… they cannot place us under an obligation” (Koopman 2013: 528). Though 154 
                                                                 
3  While it is useful for present purposes, Barad may not endorse the metaphor of a ‘hinge’ which is suggestive 
of a ‘past’ on one side and a ‘future’ on the other. While Barad  explicitly endorses genealogy as a methodology 
(Barad 2007: 390) she also states that “the “past” and the “future” are iteratively reworked and enfolded through 
the iterative practices of spacetimemattering” (Barad 2007: 315). Barad also states that “To the extent that 
Foucault presumes the presence of the past, or more gen rally the givenness of space and time, genealogy has 
been stopped short in its tracks” (Barad 2007: 474). Attempts to take Foucault’s historical ontology to Barad 
have struggled to integrate her understanding of history as successfully as they have reworked her understanding 
of agency (e.g., Lemke 2015: 16). This is not necessarily so, however, as Ian Hacking’s notion of ‘an 
indeterminacy in the past’ (Hacking 1995: 234-257) seems to demonstrate. Like Hacking, it is not the int ntion 
that the ‘historical ontology’ proposed in this article places a firm boundary between past and present. For a 
fuller discussion of Hacking’s concept see Fuller (2002), Gustafsson (2010), Hacking (2003), Roth (2002) and 
Sharrock & Leudar (2002).  
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the historical nominalism (see footnote three) of Foucault therefore sees transformation as 155 
both a historical reality and a future inevitability, transformation also remains an ethical 156 
question precisely because there is no necessary form that transformation must take. Instead, 157 
it might be suggested, there is an accountability in determining which transformations are to 158 
be brought about. By theorizing ‘the hinge’ itself, the moment of transformation, the agential-159 
cut, and by emphasising the inevitable exclusions inherent in such moments, Barad 160 
significantly furthers this body of thought. Barad makes us q estion and be accountable 161 
toward the limit-experiences and transformations we might bring about in ourselves, others, 162 
and the world while also considering the consequences of those cut  which have already been 163 
made.  164 
In sum, I am arguing that by working Barad and Foucault throug  each other we have the 165 
beginnings of a framework for an ethics of transformation hat may be of general utility. 166 
When considering autism in particular, this framework encourages us to dwell upon the 167 
delineation of, and subsequent changes in, the condition during the twentieth century as well 168 
as the inherently ethical nature of these changes. The empirical portion of this paper will 169 
consider the ethico-onto-epistemological consequences of one tra sformation in the object of 170 
autism; the incorporation of scientific uncertainties into the indeterminate bodies of autistic 171 
subjects. 172 
Transformation and uncertainty 173 
Uncertainty as a discursive structure 174 
As noted previously, Barad insists that discourse and discursive structures are key to 175 
apparatuses and play essential roles in material reality. Des Fitzgerald has recently considered 176 
the discursive structures which play a fundamental role in autism neuroscience. While 177 
Fitzgerald begins by considering the discursive structure provided by hope, optimism, and 178 
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expectation within the life sciences (Fitzgerald 2014: 241), he quickly moves on to think 179 
about the importance of ambivalence and uncertainty. Indeed it seems to be increasingly 180 
evident that uncertainty and strategies to overcome uncertai ty, so called ‘practical 181 
uncertainty work’ (Moreira et al. 2009; Pickersgill 2011; Pickersgill 2014), are entangled 182 
with the objects of scientific research.  183 
While Barad seems to be content that many of the experiments under her consideration 184 
involve “the unambiguous communication of the results of reproducible experiments” (Barad 185 
2007: 174) such reproducibility, as science studies has long shown, is hard won (Collins 186 
1975) for uncertainties are intrinsic to scientific activity (Star 1985: 392).  Of course, 187 
scientific research continues in the face of uncertainty and practical uncertainty work refers to 188 
the strategies taken by researchers in the wake of suchun ertainties intended to make 189 
research ‘do-able’ (Fujimura 1987; Webster & Eriksson 2008). Numerous studies have begun 190 
to examine the diverse forms of uncertainty work undertaken by medical and scientific 191 
practitioners (Hollin & Pearce 2015; Mellor 2010; Pinch 1981; Shackley & Wynne 1996; 192 
Star 1985; Star 1989). What the strategies identified have in common is that they seek to 193 
disarm, displace, and deflate uncertainty, pushing it to the sid -lines so that a certain science 194 
may continue.  195 
In his analyses of uncertainty in relation to antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), for 196 
example, Pickersgill (2011, 2014) notes that there is widespread uncertai ty amongst 197 
practitioners regarding both what ASPD is (Pickersgill calls this ‘ontological uncertainty’) 198 
and how it is best measured (‘epistemological uncertainty’). Pickersgill notes, however, that 199 
these issues: 200 
“…can be set aside through recourse to the assumed certainty of the other: the 201 
existence of antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy as unified categories can 202 
10 
 
be justified by the existence of their criteria for identifica ion; likewise, the latter are 203 
validated by the fact that their use is long-standing and, therefore, that they ‘work’. 204 
Thus [diagnostic] tools… and the psychopathologies they purport to identify become 205 
tightly bound together, co-producing the epistemological and ontological coherence of 206 
both mental health categories and their diagnostic criteria.” (Pickersgill 2011: 84) 207 
While Pickersgill here uses the language of co-production (Jasanoff 2004), these observations 208 
can usefully be understood in the language of Barad; the epistemologies and ontologies of 209 
ASPD are diffracted through one another, a process significantly affected by the uncertainty 210 
inherent in each, so that a new, stable, object of scientifi  i vestigation emerges; a particular 211 
incarnation of ASPD. The emergence of this object marks an ‘agential cut’ during which 212 
other possibilities are foreclosed and, as discussed above, Barad calls on us to be accountable 213 
for such world making activities. Similar conclusions of Pickersgill’s have been reported 214 
elsewhere (e.g. Moreira et al. 2009: 671) and it is a core thesis of this paper that the nature of 215 
autism has also been radically shaped by uncertainty work.  216 
Transformatory uncertainty and autism 217 
The specific argument advanced in this paper is that while other professional visions have 218 
conducted uncertainty work with the intent of systematically erasing or displacing uncertainty 219 
(Goodwin 1994: 608), researchers studying autism have centralis d it and diffracted it 220 
through the condition itself. Such uncertainty work has contributed towards a heterogeneous 221 
condition; an autism which is determined by its indeterminacy. This indeterminacy has 222 
become absolutely central to understandings of autism so that it can now be asserted that no 223 
two individuals with autism are the same and that an individual’s symptoms cannot be 224 
explained with reference to a single causative factor. 225 
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With regards to these indeterminacies, it is not, as Foucault s id of 18th century medicine, that 226 
"In order to know the truth of the pathological fact, the doctor must abstract the patient” 227 
(Foucault 2003: 7). It is not that the person obscures or confuses the essence of autism and 228 
that if only the individual could be pushed to one side, or controlled for in a laboratory 229 
setting, that the singular essence of autism would emerg . In the case of autism it is the 230 
condition itself which is described as indeterminate, chance like, and aleatoric.  231 
This change in the ontology of autism has potentially crucial ethical consequences. Hacking 232 
gets to the crux of the issue in his discussion concernig the politics of retrospective 233 
diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Hacking notes that pardoning soldiers 234 
executed for desertion during the First World War on the basis that they were suffering from 235 
PTSD deprives them of a degree of agency: 236 
‘The men are no longer said to have deserted, or at any rate, not to have deserted “in 237 
the first degree.” This is because if they were suffering from post-traumatic stress 238 
disorder, they were not, strictly speaking, acting voluntarily.’ (Hacking 1995: 241) 239 
In this agential cut certain properties become tied to the obj ct (PTSD) rather than the 240 
subject. This move has political and ethical consequences: On the one hand soldiers are 241 
absolved of their crime while on the other their agency is transformed into a property of 242 
PTSD itself. Likewise, in the case of a heterogeneous auti m it is not the subject who is 243 
unique, resistant, or able to change but autism itself. The et ical consequences of this are 244 
worthy of consideration.  245 
The empirical portion of this article is concerned with the emergence of this heterogeneous, 246 
indeterminate autism. I trace the agential cut responsible for this manifestation of autism to 247 
debates at the Cognitive Development Unit, University College London, during the early 248 
1990s and contest that during this time uncertainty and indeterminacy were diffracted through 249 
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one another. I suggest that this moment can be understood as an gential cut; a point where 250 
autism took on a new form while alternative possibilities disappeared. Following this analysis 251 
I return to the ethical question of transformation as proposed by Barad and Foucault and 252 
suggest that one of the foreclosures instigated by the agential cut that led to an indeterminate 253 
autism is the possibility to “rebel against the classifiers” (Hacking 1995: 239) and to be 254 
understood outside of the diagnostic framework. The possibility of ushering in further 255 
transformation thus seems to be, at least partially, forestalled within contemporary 256 
understandings.  257 
Hegemony in the UK: Materials and Context 258 
As noted previously, contemporary research into autism is particul rly concerned with 259 
uncertainty and indeterminacy; a conclusion manifest in numerous highly significant 260 
published pieces (e.g. Happé et al. 2006) and repeatedly re-affirmed within the social science 261 
literature (e.g. Fitzgerald 2014; Hollin online first; Verhoeff 2012). It is in the present, 262 
therefore, that this historical piece begins. This ‘history of the present’ (Foucault 1991: 31) 263 
has important affinities with Baradian analyses and focuses attention on both the agential cuts 264 
and ethics of transformation importan  to this piece, “making history work as a source for 265 
becoming different in the light of the contingency of the present and past likewise” (Fuggle et 266 
al. 2015: 3). 267 
Given the above methodological positioning, papers considered here were selected by tracing 268 
backwards to a moment of apparent emergence (Foucault 1977: 148) and then radiating out 269 
so that the core contestations are captured and a corpus formed. While the published 270 
scientific literature considered here is central to the emergence of heterogeneity, this analysis 271 
is not intended to provide a totalizing picture or capture the w ole of the Baradian apparatus. 272 
The focus is very much upon scientific representations of autism, to the detriment of those 273 
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voices emanating from outside of the academy. Nonetheless this research was a dominant 274 
force and, as noted above, remains of crucial importance in shaping the contemporary 275 
moment and its ethical character. 276 
The institutional history within which a heterogeneous autism emerged is important. That 277 
history, as Bonnie Evans has made clear (Evans 2013; Evans 2014), involves the twinned 278 
institutions of the Maudsley Hospital and the Institute for Psychiatry (IoP) which were at the 279 
fore of experimental research into autism in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1964 Uta 280 
Frith joined the IoP initially for an internship and then, under the supervision of Neil 281 
O’Connor and Beate Hermelin, a doctorate (Bishop 2008: 17). In 1967 O’Connor and 282 
Hermelin tabled a bid to the Medical Research Council for a ‘Developmental Psychology 283 
Unit’ to be based at University College London (UCL; O’Connor 1975: 101) and Frith 284 
promptly followed across London Bridge to take up a position with them in Bloomsbury. 285 
It was in the 1980s, however, that cognitive psychology came to dominate the field of autism 286 
research (Hollin 2014). This dominance arose following O’Connor’s retirement and the 287 
subsequent appointment, in 1982, of John Morton to head the newly renamed ‘Cognitive 288 
Development Unit’ (CDU) at UCL (Bishop 2008: 18). The change in nomenclature was 289 
significant and, as Frith notes, Morton encouraged researchers to think “that the mind was not 290 
a big bowl of spaghetti tangles, but more like a building with different floors and rooms” 291 
(quoted in Feinstein 2010: 158). It was within this institutional nexus that, during the 1980s, 292 
Frith “defined contemporary research into atypical development” (Snowling et al. 2008: 13) 293 
and, as a special edition of the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology demonstrates 294 
(Snowling et al. 2008), this task was aided by a stream of PhD students who have gone on to 295 
form a veritable ‘who’s who’ of autism research; most notably, for present purposes, Simon 296 
Baron-Cohen and Francesca Happé (who also interned with O’Connor and Hermelin: 297 
Feinstein 2010: 159). 298 
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It is not that the work of these researchers was left uncontested within the academy; those 299 
from other research centres and disciplinary perspectives frequently contested the findings of 300 
those at CDU. For example, Peter Hobson, a psychologist sympathetic towards 301 
psychoanalytic understandings of autism, engaged in long and heated debates with these 302 
researchers during the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Hollin (2013: 94-103) for an overview 303 
of these disputes). Nonetheless psychology as a discipline was gaining significant sway over 304 
autism (Eyal et al. 2010: 111) and this school, in particular, w s coming to hold a prominence 305 
it maintains today; Uta Frith is perhaps the world’s most celebrated autism researcher, Simon 306 
Baron-Cohen arguably the most prominent autism researcher in the UK, and Francesca 307 
Happé sat on DSM-5’s Neurodevelopmental Disorders work group. 308 
X marks the spot: Cognitive homogeneity 309 
As others have noted (Verhoeff 2014: 67) discussions of heterog neity in autism certainly 310 
pre-existed the 1990s (e.g. Freeman 1977: 143). Those working at the CDU prior to the mid-311 
1990s were not unaware of these existing claims of heterogeneity, but neither did they 312 
purport to have their work of mapping out a coherent condition undermined by them. Instead, 313 
cognitive scientists claimed to have located the space within which autism’s truth and unity 314 
was to be found; the cognitive level. Thus autism was described as an ‘X-shaped disorder’ 315 
(Frith et al. 1991: 436) with heterogeneous biological causes and heterogeneous behavioural 316 
manifestations but, in between, a homogeneous cognitive profile. 317 
Armed with such an understanding, research during the 1980s was frequently concerned with 318 
a ‘grand theory of everything’; an attempt to find a cognitive explanation which would 319 
explain all of the features associated with autism. Two of the most prominent theories, which 320 
are also of most relevance to the emergence of heterogenity in the 1990s, were the theory of 321 
metarepresentations and the theory of weak central coherence (WCC). While the analytic 322 
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thrust of this paper lies with later contestations of these theories, it is an important step to 323 
describe their key features. Importantly, both of these theories attempted to explain all 324 
aspects of autism, both within and between individuals. 325 
Metarepresentation 326 
The basis of the metarepresentation hypothesis is this: there are various instances during 327 
which people act on the world in ways which I, as an onlooker, know to be inconsistent with 328 
how the world really is. Sometimes these acts are intentional, for instance when someone 329 
uses a metaphor (‘the brain is a Swiss army knife’) or engages in pretend play (‘I’ll be 330 
Elvis’). On other occasions the inconsistency is accidental, such as when someone has a false 331 
belief about a scenario (‘Kate believes the dog to be in its kennel, but I know it’s escaped’). 332 
In all of these instances the current representation of the world (brain as knife; impersonator 333 
as Elvis; dog in kennel) is divorced from a second more accurte representation (brain as 334 
biological object; Elvis as dead (probably); dog as destroying living room). In the key 335 
theoretical paper related to the metarepresentation hypothesis, Alan Leslie argues that making 336 
sense of this bifurcation requires a specific piece of cognitive architecture known as a 337 
‘decoupling mechanism’ which allows one to dissociate the current context from broader 338 
understandings (Leslie 1987: 419).  339 
It is this decoupling mechanism which is posited to be dysfunctional in those with autism. On 340 
the basis of this single cognitive deficit, those with autism are expected to lack the ability to 341 
engage in pretend play, have an overly-literal interpretation of language (e.g. a failure to use 342 
or understand metaphor and irony; see, e.g., Happé 1993) and an inability to impute mental 343 
states, such as belief, onto other people. These three skills – pretend play, metaphor use, 344 
theory of mind ability – are taken to be indissociable within the metarepresentation ccount 345 
as they are all governed by the same cognitive module, the decoupling device. Various tasks 346 
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were developed to examine an individual’s ability to form metarepresentations and by the end 347 
of the 1980s it was claimed that all individuals with autism were impaired in this regard.  348 
Thus, autism could be considered a “case of specific developmental delay” (Baron-Cohen 349 
1989: 294)4. As might be expected from a disorder which was understood as having an ‘X-350 
shaped’ profile, homogeneity was to be found at the cognitive level. This was also the case 351 
for the theory of ‘weak central coherence’, again developed by Uta Frith and colleagues at the 352 
CDU in the late 1980s, and intended to subsume the theory of metarepresentations and make 353 
up for its shortcomings. 354 
Weak Central Coherence 355 
The theory of weak central coherence (WCC; Frith 1989) was formulated in order to explain 356 
some of the typical strengths, as well as weaknesses, associated with individuals with autism. 357 
Importantly, when formulated it was suggested that the WCC might subsume the 358 
metarepresentation hypothesis (Frith 1989: 165) and detail the “one particular fault in central 359 
thought processes” (Frith 1989: 116); once again homogeneity was to be found at the 360 
cognitive level.  361 
The WCC hypothesis itself is reasonably straightforward; the claim is that individuals with 362 
autism struggle to see the wood for the trees. Those with autism might be very good (indeed, 363 
better than average) at noticing detail but struggle to place those details within a broader 364 
context. Such a conclusion explains various deficits in autism, such as the tendency to 365 
mispronounce homophones like ‘minute’, presumably because the sentence context (‘the 366 
                                                                 
4  Perhaps the most famous tests of metarepresentation bility are false belief tasks such as the ‘Sally-Anne 
Test’, developed by Wimmer and Perner in 1983 and deployed to examine theory of mind in autism shortly after 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). The findings from false belief tasks were so striking that, for many, this theory of 
autism became known as the ‘theory of mind’ account of autism. At least in its initial articulation, however, this 
nomenclature is misleading. As this section has made clear, theory of mind impairments were articulated as a 
symptom of deeper cognitive impairment to a decoupling mechanism. This inability to decouple representations 
from each other – a deficit in forming metarepresentations – also explains poor metaphor use and a lack of 
pretend play. For further information on metarepresentations and the manner in which false belief tasks are 
underpinned by Alan Leslie’s hypothesis see Hollin (2014: 104-107).  
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minute speck of dust’, ‘one minute past the hour’) has not been accounted for. 367 
Simultaneously, however, WCC is able to explain various strengths; those diagnosed with 368 
autism, for example, seem to be faster at finding the location of a jigsaw puzzle piece within 369 
a picture, perhaps because not being distracted by the broader imag  is an advantage on this 370 
particular task (see Hollin (2014: 107-109) for more details).  371 
Emerging uncertainties 372 
While both the metarepresentations account of autism and the theory of WCC had accrued 373 
significant amounts of experimental evidence, by the 1990s difficulties with both theories 374 
were beginning to emerge. In 1992 Dermot Bowler published a paper which cast doubt on the 375 
claims of those at the CDU, particularly those associated with the metarepresentations 376 
account.  377 
 Bowler’s study essentially re-ran an experiment conducted by Baron-Cohen in 1989 which 378 
examined second-order belief attribution. In the example of false belief given earlier it was 379 
stated that even though I know the dog is in the living room it is still possible that Kate 380 
believes the dog to be in the kennel. This ability is known as first-order belief attribution for 381 
one is required to impute a mental state onto one other agent (Kate). In an experiment 382 
published in 1985 Baron-Cohen and colleagues showed that over 80 per cent of those 383 
diagnosed with autism failed to demonstrate the capacity to make first-order belief 384 
attributions. Despite its landmark status, this paper’s finding that a subset of those with 385 
autism could pass these tests was troubling for it would still seem to be possible to possess a 386 
theory of mind and have autism, suggesting an ability to create metarepresentations which 387 
should be impossible in the framework outlined by Leslie. In 1989 Baron-Cohen published a 388 
study which seemed to overcome this theoretical hurdle. Passing the test in this new 389 
experiment required the mental state of two individuals to be considered (e.g. ‘where does 390 
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John think that Kate thinks the dog is?’), a harder skill known as second-order belief 391 
attribution. Baron-Cohen et al. found that even those individuals with autism able to make 392 
first-order belief attributions failed to make second-order attributions, once more making it 393 
conceivable that there was a specific developmental delay in metarepresentational abilities in 394 
autism.  395 
Bowler examined second-order belief attribution skills in a group of individuals diagnosed 396 
with Asperger’s (Bowler 1992: 883)5. Surprisingly, Bowler found that the majority of his 397 
participants were able to make second-order belief attributions and, what is more, success 398 
rates did not differ significantly from controls. Uncertainty increased further when these 399 
results were taken alongside two further pieces of information. Firstly, when participants 400 
were asked to provide justification for their answers, it was found that even those who passed 401 
consistently provided explanations without reference to second-order beliefs. In other words, 402 
justifications of the sort “because John thought that Kate thought” were virtually never 403 
uttered. This finding suggested that alternative routes, not requiring a theory of mind, could 404 
be taken to arrive at the correct solution to second-order beli f attribution tests.  Secondly, 405 
Bowler found that when the parents of those individuals making up the Asperger’s group 406 
                                                                 
5 The relationship between autism and Asperger’s syndrome has been, and continues to be, disputed  and 
contested (Singh 2011). Research undertaken at the CDU frequently notes  (e.g. Happé 1991; Happé 1994b; 
Frith et al. 1994) that sampled individuals meet criteria for ‘Autistic Disorder’, as defined in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual III – Revised  (DSM III-R; American Psychiatric Association 1987). DSM III -R makes no 
mention of Asperger’s syndrome and Bowler draws his definition of Asperger’s syndrome from a 1981 paper by 
Lorna Wing. Wing recommends the label of Asperger’s on pragmatic grounds, believing it more acceptable to 
some parents (1981: 124), while also arguing that autism and Asperger’s  most likely “have in common 
impairment of certain aspects of brain function”. Bowler, likewise, is formally agnostic on the separability of 
autism and Asperger’s although he does note that the notion of an ‘autistic continuum’ advanced in Wing’s 
paper: “…implies that people with Asperger’s syndrome and people with classic autism as described by Kanner 
(1943) represent sub-sets of a larger population of people with social impairment”  (Bowler 1992: 878). Bowler, 
at the very least, is demonstrably prepared to test hypotheses of autism by utilising a sample consisting of those 
diagnosed with Asperger’s. 
This discussion also makes clear that, while important, the emerging discussion of an ‘autism spectrum’ is not 
immediately related to the issue of cognitive heterogeneity and is broadly consistent with the ‘X-shaped’ 
disorder previously detailed by Frith (see above). Both Wing (Wing 1981: 124) and DSM III-R (American 
Psychiatric Association 1987: 33-4) argue that there are diverse causes for these conditions and diverse 
behavioural consequences with unity found between th se two points. 
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were presented with a retrospective questionnaire they recalled little or no imaginary play 407 
during the childhood of their offspring. This finding suggested that some individuals with 408 
Asperger’s may have theory of mind abilities but not the capacity to engage in pretend play.  409 
Bowler was stinging in his criticism of the metarepresentations account of autism, making 410 
two key criticisms (Bowler 1992: 888-890). Firstly the seeming ability to pass these tests 411 
without the expected mind-based justifications suggests that the: 412 
  “…ability to solve problems that involve a second-order theory of mind does not 413 
 strongly depend on having developed either joint referencing or symbolic play skills” 414 
 (Bowler 1992: 886).  415 
Instead, it may be the case that effortful, logical, cognitive processes can also lead to the 416 
correct answers on these tests. Here, Bowler is introducing an epistemological uncertainty 417 
(Pickersgill 2011: 84) as there is the suggestion that these tests may simply not be measuring 418 
what they were intended to measure; the capacity to attribute beliefs to other individuals. 419 
Secondly, in the metarepresentation account put forward by Leslie (1987) pretend play and 420 
theory of mind abilities should be indissociable for the same cognitive module, the 421 
decoupling mechanism, was believed to govern both behaviours. That this Asperger’s group 422 
did not, according to their parents, engage in pretend play as children and yet could pass 423 
theory of mind tests is therefore problematic as it challenges the connection between those 424 
abilities (Bowler 1992: 890). This is an ontological uncertainty (Pickersgill 2011: 84), a 425 
suggestion that the cognitive architecture posited to be at the node of the ‘X’, the decoupling 426 
mechanism crucial in giving autism its coherence, may not take the form anticipated. I argue 427 
that, in the wake of these findings, the ‘uncertainty work’ which entered into the material-428 
discursive apparatus in order to make research on autism doable contributed significantly to a429 
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novel agential cut. It is the nature of this agential cut which delineated a new, heterogeneous 430 
autism and which will be considered in the following section.   431 
 Diffracting uncertainties through ontologies 432 
Those at CDU were aware of Bowler’s findings long before they were submitted for 433 
publication. Indeed, Uta Frith’s PhD student, Francesca Happé, spoke to Bowler about his 434 
results and considered them at length in her thesis (e.g. Happé 1991: 226). 435 
Happé’s thesis is concerned, primarily, with overcoming two uncertainties. Firstly, the 436 
reprocussions for the metarepresentation account of autism following the finding that some 437 
individuals with autism were able to pass second-order belief attribution tests (Bowler 1992; 438 
see also Ozonoff et al. 1991). Secondly, the proposed relationship between weak central 439 
coherence and metaresresentations, whereby a metarepresentational deficit is proposed as a 440 
consequence of WCC (Frith 1989: 163).  441 
Hackers and Passers: Introducing interpersonal heterogeneity  442 
As noted above, when individuals taking part in Bowler’s study were asked to justify their 443 
beliefs, those who passed the test rarely considered mental states (see above, Bowler 1992: 444 
883, 886). Perhaps, therefore, it is possible to pass second-order belief attribution tests 445 
without considering theory of mind at all? Such a conclusion would mean that Bowler’s 446 
results would reflect not an intact theory of mind in research subjects but a capacity to find an 447 
alternative route to the desired destination in some particul ly high functioning individuals. 448 
In a phrase first used by Happé in her thesis (e.g. Happé 1991: 78) and in press in 1994 (Frith 449 
et al. 1994: 110; Happé 1994: 130), such an ability to circumvent theory of mind tasks is 450 
called ‘hacking out’: 451 
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“[Autistic individuals’] success could be seen not as proof of theory of mind ability, 452 
but rather as evidence of the “hacking out” of some strategy for solving the tasks.” 453 
(Frith et al. 1994: 130) 454 
The question to be asked was, therefore: 455 
“Are they [autistic individuals] simply better problem-solvers, more able to devise a 456 
strategy to answer theory of mind questions – thanks perhaps to more experience, 457 
higher IQ or a more social disposition?” (Happé 1993: 115) 458 
Testing the hypothesis that individuals with autism were hacking out solutions to tests 459 
required some methodological innovation. Frith, Happé, and Siddons suggested that: 460 
  “…“hacking” would enable individuals to solve false belief attribution tasks, but 461 
 probably would not generalize to the large variety of mentalizi g situations in real 462 
 life” (Frith et al. 1994: 118).  463 
The unique,dynamic environments encountered in ‘real life’ were expected to prove too 464 
much for the effortful hacking strategies proposed to underlie the success in belief attribution 465 
tests. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 24 adolescents with autism, each of whom 466 
sat two classic, first-order tests. Eight of these individuals passed both tests and were labelled 467 
‘passers’. Meanwhile, a teacher or caregiver completed a questionnaire designed to assess an 468 
individual’s ‘adaptive’ behaviour in the domains of “communication, daily living skills and 469 
socialisation”; this test was designed to examine theory of mind ability in the real life 470 
contexts in which hackers were proposed to struggle (Frith et al. 1994: 113).  471 
Frith et al. report that individuals diagnosed with autism did indeed recieve particularly low 472 
scores on the socialisation portion of the questionnaire, unsurprising given that social 473 
impairment is a core symptom of autism. An additional finding was, however, that on 474 
questions which must be solved using theory of mind abilities, those ‘passers’ who could 475 
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complete first-order belief attribution tests scored significa tly higher than those who failed. 476 
This difference was found to stem, almost entirely, from three of the eight passers who scored 477 
particularly highly on interactive sociability questions (Frith et al. 1994: 118). On the basis of 478 
these three high scoring individuals the authors conclude that: 479 
“Our results, then suggest the existence of subgroups within the autistic spectrum. The 480 
majority have no understanding of other minds, and demonstrate “mind-blindness” in 481 
the laboratory as well as in everyday life. Then there a  those who have learned 482 
limited strategies sufficient to pass highly structured artificial tests of theory of mind, 483 
but still show no evidence of mentalizing in real life. In addition, our results suggest 484 
that there is a third subgroup who appear to be able, to some extent, to represent 485 
mental states. They show evidence of this not only in the laboratory, but also in real 486 
life.” (Frith et al. 1994: 118) 487 
Those three individuals who ‘pass’ the questionnaire are deemed to be genuinely different to 488 
those who fail or ‘hack out’ a solution – they really do possess a theory of mind. 489 
The conclusions drawn within these literatures, which arise in direct response to the 490 
uncertainties aroused by the work of Bowler, include some particul ly noticable examples of 491 
uncertainty work. As mentioned previously, Bowler raises two distinct uncertainties – an 492 
epistemological uncertainty (do these tests measure what they purport to measure?) and an 493 
ontological uncertainty (does Leslie’s proposed decoupling mechanism exist?). Despite the 494 
prolonged engagement with Bowler’s paper from members of CDU (e.g. Frith & Happé 495 
1994b; Frith & Happé 1994a; Frith et al. 1994; Happé 1991; Happé 1993; Happé 1994; 496 
Happé 1994a; Happé 1994b) Bowler’s ontological uncertainty is never investigated. 497 
Uncertainty is instead transformed and condensed (Shackley & Wynne 1996: 283); there is a 498 
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recognition of the epistemological uncertainty and potential problems of method, which are 499 
duly explored, while the ontological claim about the nature of autism itself is ignored. 500 
The epistemological uncertainty itself is tackled by slicing up experimental space in news 501 
ways. Within the literature under consideration there is extensive redescription of the tests 502 
through which cognitive hegemony over autism had been based. The experiments used to 503 
research first- and second-order belief attributions had previously been described as 504 
“ingenious” (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985: 39) and were explicitly stated to converge with real 505 
life (Wimmer & Perner 1983: 124). There was, thus, no suggestion that laboratory findings 506 
should be seen as particularly problematic or that the laboratory consistuted a space with 507 
distinct properties. In the wake of Bowler’s uncertainties, however, these experiments are 508 
seen to constitute ‘highly structured artificial tests’ which cannot be taken for granted and 509 
need to be investigated. There is a sharp break inserted between he space of the laboratory 510 
and the ‘dynamic real world’, a strategy for dealing with uncertainty which can be called 511 
‘spatial segmentation’.  512 
The term ‘spatial segmentation’ draws upon Star’s notion of ‘temporal segmentation’ (Star 513 
1985: 400). Temporal segmentation refers to a form of uncertainty work wherein researchers 514 
offer only a provisional diagnosis of an ongoing uncertainty and wait until the conclusion of 515 
that event before accommodating any uncertain, local features into existing understandings. 516 
Some (longer) time frames are thus constructed as both separat  and more meaningful than 517 
other (shorter) time frames. In this instance, I am suggesting that space (rather than time) is 518 
cut up in new ways in order to cope with uncertainty. One space (‘the dynamic real world’) is 519 
deemed more relevant to the ontology of autism than another (t  laboratory). Uncertain 520 
findings in the laboratory are judged to be provisional until compared with that second space 521 
and are subsequently reinterpreted in the wake of findings in ‘the real world’. 522 
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This spatial segmentation ensures that there is a tight bnding of uncertainty to a particular 523 
space, the laboratory, and enables uncertainties to be corraled within that setting where they 524 
can be systematically managed (Shackley & Wynne 1996: 281). What is more, once autism 525 
has been diffracted through these newly segmented spaces, new subgroups begin to be 526 
delineated and passers, hackers, and failers emerge as meaningful d distinct groups. Indeed, 527 
following the finding that all epistemological uncertainties actually stem from an 528 
ontologically distinct group of passers it becomes apparent that he theory of mind account is 529 
still relevant, and indeed validated, for both failers and hackers. Uncertainty is thus dealt with 530 
by being located within autism itself, so that epistemological uncertainties become entwined 531 
with ontological indeterminancies.  532 
Within this research practical uncertainty work is becoming entangled with the ontological 533 
reality of autism. Further, and importantly, the agential cut which has demarcated autism 534 
from the apparatus used to investigate it has placed uncertainty on the ‘object’ side of the 535 
object/instrument split: an indeterminate object rather than an uncertain instrument. Once 536 
uncertainty is managed in this way new classifications – failers, hackers, and passers - are 537 
deliniated as objects of scientific investigation. The terms emege as ‘exteriorities within’ the 538 
condition and autism itself becomes interpersonally heterogene us. It is the emergence of 539 
these new groupings, and the addition of ‘heterogeneity’ to conceptual repertoire and 540 
apparatus used to study autism, which I argue constitutes an agential cut. 541 
No single explanation: Intra-personal heterogeneity 542 
While uncertainties over the metarepresentation account f autism were countered through 543 
reference to an interpersonally heterogeneous condition, what is less clear is why ‘passers’ 544 
should still be considered within the rubric of autism given their fundamental difference to 545 
the other two sub-groups. This uncertainty is, however, off-set through reference to WCC. As 546 
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will be recalled, in 1989 Uta Frith suggested that it was possible to explain 547 
metarepresentation deficits as stemming from WCC in individuals with autism. Thus, while 548 
there is interpersonal heterogeneity in relation to metarepresentation there remains in WCC 549 
the possibility of a deeper cognitive unity. Indeed, Happé explicitly asserts that failers, 550 
hackers, and passers could all be incorporated within a WCC framework (1994: 146).  551 
This hypothesis was examined in a further paper of 1994 (Happé 1994b). Here Happé gave 552 
I.Q. tests to 51 individuals with autism, 21 of whom were able to pass first-order belief 553 
attributions tests and 30 of whom failed such tests. The I.Q. test used in this study, the 554 
Wechsler Intelligence Scales, can be divided into four subsections. Individuals with autism 555 
frequently have a ‘spikey’ I.Q. profile on this test, meaning that whereas individuals in 556 
control groups normally score equally across the different subsections, those with autism 557 
often show relative peaks of performance on subsections favouring local processing (the 558 
‘block design’ and ‘digit span’ sections which, to continue with a ‘wood for the trees’ 559 
analogy, require a focus upon trees) and relative weaknesses on areas which may require 560 
theory of mind (‘comprehension’ and ‘picture arrangement’ subsections; see Happé 1994b: 561 
1463-1465 for further details).  562 
Happé reports a significant difference on the comprehension subsection of the I.Q. test, with 563 
those who could pass theory of mind tasks demonstrating a relative strength while failers 564 
show a relative weakness. Happé concludes, therefore, that the comprehension subsection of 565 
the I.Q. test requires theory of mind. However there was no significant difference between 566 
the groups on the other subsections; both groups showed strengths o  the block design and 567 
digit span subsections, while no particular pattern was found in the picture arrangement 568 
subsection. Happé thus reaches the following conclusion: 569 
26 
 
 “...weak central coherence is a feature of the information processing of all autistic 570 
 subjects regardless of theory of mind ability. It is possible that some autistic subjects 571 
 will show impaired Block Design performance, due for example to superimposed 572 
 spatial processing deficits. The central coherence hypothesis predicts, however, that 573 
 where errors occur they should be predominantly of a type which violates the whole 574 
 form but preserves pattern details. Indeed, preliminary error analysis of an 575 
 independent autistic sample, appears to confirm this prediction.” (Happé 1994b: 1469) 576 
 This finding appears to support the notion of cognitive homogeneity; all individuals, 577 
regardless of theory of mind ability, seem to show WCC. However, th  WCC hypothesis also 578 
posits that WCC should be negatively correlated with theory of mind deficits; greater WCC 579 
should equal poorer theory of mind ability. If better performance on theblock design 580 
subsection is demonstrative of greater WCC, therefore, one w uld expect to see greater peaks 581 
of performance in Happé’s theory of mind failers. This is not found and, thus, it was 582 
concluded that WCC could not account for theory of mind performance: 583 
 “The independence of Block Design and Digit Span performance peaks from theory 584 
 of mind tasks success suggests that the postulated weak central coherence must be 585 
 thought of as separate from the mentalising impairment in autism. This is a change 586 
 from Frith’s (1989) original position...” (Happé 1994b: 1469) 587 
The possibility that WCC is found universally in autism remains following the findings of 588 
Happé. The notion that WCC and theory of mind abilities are not correlated, however, 589 
suggests that WCC cannot be used to explain theory of mind i pairments. What is more, and 590 
as detailed in the sections above, the splitting of autism into subgroups has confirmed the 591 
importance of theory of mind impairments in the majority of cases. There thus seem to be 592 
two, unrelated, theories that are essential to understanding autism but which are causally 593 
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unrelated and, indeed, not manifest in every case. The authors extricate themselves from this 594 
uncertain situation by suggesting that autism is not only i terpersonally heterogeneous but 595 
also intrapersonally heterogeneous; both WCC and theory of mind ipairments are typical of 596 
autism but cannot be used to explain each other and, instead, n e  to be considered 597 
independently. 598 
Summary 599 
It is worth considering these conclusions carefully, as they are particularly knotty. Firstly, 600 
epistemological uncertainty over the metarepresentation hypothesis of autism was offset 601 
through reference to three ontologically discrete populations within the spectrum; passers, 602 
hackers, and failers. It was then shown that theory of mind was relevant to the latter two of 603 
these sub-groups. These practices ensured that theory of mind must continue to be conceived 604 
as crucial to understanding autism in the majority of cases, a conclusion reaffirmed in a paper 605 
entitled ‘autism: beyond “theory of mind”’ where Frith and Happé state: 606 
 “At present, all the evidence suggests that we should retain the idea of a modular and 607 
 specific mentalizing [theory of mind] deficit in our caus l explanation of the triad of 608 
 impairment in  autism. It is still our belief that nothing captures the essence of autism 609 
 so precisely as the idea of mindblindness.” (Frith & Happé 1994a: 126)  610 
WCC was also necessary to this understanding of autism however as, following the finding 611 
that not all individuals with autism have theory of mind deficits, WCC provided some level 612 
of interpersonal coherence. However WCC at the same time proved unable to explain theory 613 
of mind symptoms of autism, as was initially suggested: 614 
 “...this explanation alone will not suffice. Therefore, our present conception is that 615 
 there may be two rather difference cognitive characteristics that underlie autism.” 616 
 (Frith & Happé 1994a: 126) 617 
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The theory of mind account of autism, therefore, only makes s nse across the clinical 618 
population in the presence of WCC, for the theory of WCC shows an underlying unity in an 619 
apparently heterogeneous population. At the same time, WCC can only explain autism within 620 
a particular individual if theory of mind is retained as a separate and discrete concept, for 621 
WCC abilities do not seem to correlate with theory of mind skills. The uncertainties inherent 622 
in each theory, and the inter-relations between them, are diffracted through one another and 623 
construct autism as an indeterminate condition, a disorder to be understood as both intra- and 624 
inter-personally heterogeneous.  625 
The significance – ontologically, epistemologically and of course ethically - of the agential 626 
cut enacted in this research, and the form of autism delineated by it, is made apparent if one 627 
compares the above quotes with one made just three years earlier by Uta Frith: 628 
 “...if future research comes to the conclusion that the coreimpairments in autism are 629 
 different and have different underlying causes, then this [cognitive] convergence 630 
 would vanish, and, in the absence of convergence at the biological level, the 631 
 justification for the single term ‘autism’ would be removed” (Frith et al. 1991: 438) 632 
This is a straightforward assertion that autism is an ‘X-shaped’ syndrome, with associated 633 
symptoms stemming from a single cognitive cause. Just three years later, uncertainties in 634 
various theories had diffracted through the condition itself and autism had become 635 
indeterminate and heterogeneous. This change, I suggest, is of ethical importance. Barad 636 
states that: 637 
 “Ethics is about mattering, about taking account of the entangled materializations of 638 
 which we are a part, including new configurations, new subjectivities, new 639 
 possibilities – even the smallest cut matters.” (Barad 2007: 384)  640 
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The discussion of this paper will consider this new configuration of autism, the new 641 
subjectivities which emerge and, crucially, the new possibilities which now exist. 642 
Discussion 643 
Agential cuts 644 
To summarise; Barad describes an agential cut, and its consequences, as follows:  645 
 “…a local cut that produces “objects” of particular knowledge practices within the 646 
 particular phenomena… [The] apparatus specifies an agential cut that enacts a 647 
 resolution… of the semantic, as well as ontic, indeterminacy. Hence apparatuses are 648 
 boundary-making practices.” (Barad 2007: 147-148, italics removed) 649 
An agential cut, therefore, is the moment when a novel, boundaried object emerges as a result 650 
of the material-discursive features of a particular apparatus. Simultaneously, this enactment 651 
necessitates exclusions as other possibilities are foreclosed and Barad’s ethics centre upon 652 
these exclusions. I argued during the introduction that an agential cut can be considered as 653 
being akin to a ‘hinge’ and that an investigation concerning the assembly of an apparatus 654 
which produces a cut could be articulated as Foucauldian history (of the formation of the 655 
subject, in this instance).  656 
Empirically, I have sought to stay close to both Barad, focusing upon a small number of 657 
scientific experiments, and Foucault, by attempting to tease out the tangled origins of an 658 
apparently natural concept. I have argued that the small body of research conducted during 659 
the 1990s constituted an ‘agential cut’ wherein a particular object emerged - an indeterminate 660 
autism – and that uncertainty and ‘practical uncertainty work’ (Moreira et al. 2009; 661 
Pickersgill 2011) aimed at making research ‘doable’ (Webster & Eriksson 2008) was a 662 
crucial feature within the apparatus.  663 
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This research into autism is important for two reasons. Firstly, and generally, attention is 664 
drawn to uncertainty and uncertainty work as a potentially important and unstable part of an 665 
apparatus. Secondly, and specifically, the emergence of a heterog neous autism has been 666 
significant within the field of autism research. Indeed, narratives which I trace back to these 667 
discussions in the early 1990s have, over the subsequent 20 years, arguably become the 668 
dominant way to think about autism.   669 
The ethics of transformation 670 
In this analysis I have attempted to not only undertake a history of the formation of autism 671 
but also to open space for an ethical consideration of the exclusions necessitated in this 672 
particular becoming. It is with the second of these matters which I conclude.  673 
Any form of engagement with medical and psychiatric servic s may force individuals into 674 
particular forms of agency and subjectivity (Callon & Rabeharisoa 2004). This is hardly 675 
news, and Ian Hacking’s previously mentioned discussion of PTSD makes the ethical stakes 676 
of these debates clear; the agency – or, at least, the form of agency – previously tied to 677 
deserting soldiers was ‘cut’ from them and tied to PTSD. As Hacking noted (1995: 241) this 678 
drastically decreases the range of acts available to the individuals concerned.  679 
One of the core claims about autism is that a particular individual is socially atypical. Social 680 
(dys)functioning, which might be thought of as a dynamic, contextually dependent, and co-681 
produced achievement (Rapley 2004), is instead re-imagined as a permanent property of a 682 
particular diagnostic entity, outside of the situation or the subject’s control. At the centre of 683 
the object of autism, as with PTSD, sits a denial of subjectivity and a refusal to acknowledge 684 
that things could have been different. The ethical significa ce of heterogeneity is that it 685 
radically extends the passivity attributed to the autistic ubject. Consider the ‘passers’ and 686 
‘hackers’ who are delineated in the cut examined in this article. These individuals were still 687 
31 
 
corralled into the diagnostic pen; their motives, actions, and dispositions may have allowed 688 
them to escape the test in question but they could not escape a heterogeneous autism. 689 
Agency, difference, and resistance were re-imagined not as a property of subjects but as a 690 
property of autism, accounted for by its heterogeneous nature.  691 
This is not to say that autistic subjects have been anything like silenced by these cuts. These 692 
discourses have been picked up, modified, and appropriated (O’Neil 2008; Ortega 2009; 693 
Singh 2011). This is perhaps most obvious in the use of multi-coloured jigsaw pieces to 694 
symbolise autism and the assertion that ‘if you’ve met one person with autism, you’ve met 695 
one person with autism’ (Moore 2014: 151). This does not alter the fact that heterogeneity 696 
places limits on these forms of engagement or that heterog neity makes certain forms of 697 
engagement hard/impossible; Hacking’s soldiers with PTSD, and their relatives, could surely 698 
‘rebel against the classifiers’ through a range of means but it is literally unthinkable that they 699 
could desert in the first degree. Despite significant mouldings, the individuals discussed here 700 
are, likewise, still understood as autistic. It is these matters which should be a central concern 701 
for an ethics of transformation. 702 
 I do not wish to suggest that the lack of unity in the population diagnosed with autism 703 
demonstrates that the classification is fundamentally misguided – nor that the researchers in 704 
question acted with anything other than honesty and with integrity. One of the benefits of the 705 
Baradian/Foucauldian framework within which this article is situated is that there is no need 706 
to choose between the temporal nature of autism as a diagnosis and the reality of the 707 
condition. This framework does not suggest that the autism of those diagnosed today is more 708 
or less real that those diagnosed in the 1980s. What is contended, however is that there is “the 709 
need for an ethics of responsibility and accountability not only f r what we know, how we 710 
know, and what we do but, in part, for what exists” (Barad 2007: 243). As Foucault notes, 711 
there is no obligation to transform a heterogeneous autism simply because we can examine its 712 
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knotted origins in the early 1990s; what we must ask, however, is if the benefits of diagnosis 713 
are worth the costs of understanding forms of social differenc  as inescapably pathological. 714 
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